Charles Kinne v. Industrial Commission of Utah : Brief of Defendant State Insurance Fund by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (1965 –)
1979
Charles Kinne v. Industrial Commission of Utah :
Brief of Defendant State Insurance Fund
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Brian R. Florence; Attorney for Plaintiff ROBERT B. HANSEN,
FRANK V. NELSON; Attorneys for DefendantM. David Eckersley; Attorney for Defendant State
FundAndrew R. Hurley; Attorney for Defendant Wynn
This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (1965 –) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Kinne v. Indus. Comm. Of Utah, No. 16447 (Utah Supreme Court, 1979).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc2/1746
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES KINNE / 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, SUSAN WYNN, and THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 16447 
WRIT OF REVIEW FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT STATE INSURANCE FUND 
M. David Eckersley 
Black & Moore 
Attorney for Defendant State 
Fund 
500 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Andrew R. Hurley 
Lowe & Hurley 
Attorney for Defendant Wynn 
1011 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Frank v. Nelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant Commission 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
818 - 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
SL!J 101979 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES KINNE 1 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, SUSAN WYNN, and THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
Case No. 16447 
WRIT OF REVIEW FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT STATE INSURANCE FUND 
M. David Eckersley 
Black & Moore 
Attorney for Defendant State 
Fund 
500 Ten Broadway Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Andrew R. Hurley 
Lowe & Hurley 
Attorney for Defendant Wynn 
1011 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Frank v. Nelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant Commission 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
818 - 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
statement of the Nature of the Case • • • • 
Disposition by the Industrial Commission •• 
Relief Sought on Review 
Statement of Facts ••• 
Argument 
POINT I. CHARLES KINNE WAS THE DIRECT 
EMPLOYER OF MAX L. WYNN AND AS SUCH 
rs LIABLE TO HIS DEPENDENTS FOR THE 
STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED WORKMEN'S 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS. 
Con cl us ion. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 
CASES CITED 
Blevins & Montgomery Builders, Inc. v. Gregory, 
3 71 S • W. 2 d 9 4 2 (Ky. 19 6 3) • • • • • • • • • • 
Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton·, 
538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975) ••••••• 
Jones v. Southern Tupelo Lumber Co., 257 La. 869, 
244 So. 2d 815 (1971) •••••• 
Lee v. Chevron Oil, 565 P.2d 1128 (Utah 1977) • 
Murray v. Wasatch Grading Co., 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 
940 (1929). • • • • • • • • • • • •••• 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
8 
6 
7 
6 
5 
3 
Weber County v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 85, 
71P.2dl77 (1937) ••••••••••••••• •• • 3 
STATUTES CITED 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (Supp. 1979). 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-46 (1953) •••• 
TREATISE CITED 
lB A. Larson, workmen's Compensation Law §49.11 (1979). 
3' 5' 6 
7 
6 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CHARLES KINNE , 
Plaintiff, 
vs. Case No. 16447 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, SUSAN WYNN, and THE 
STATE INSURANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT STATE INSURANCE FUND 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff is seeking review of an Orde~ of the Industrial 
Conunission of Utah awarding workmen's compensation benefits to Susan 
Wynn as the dependent widow of Max L. Wynn. 
DISPOSITION BY THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
On March 27, 1979, the Industrial Commission entered a 
final Order awarding Susan Wynn the statutorily prescribed death 
benefits for the death of her husband Max L. Wynn, who was killed 
while in the course and scope of his employment with Charles Kinne 
and Freeport Transport, Inc. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON REVIEW 
Plaintiff Charles Kinne is seeking to have the Order of 
the Industrial commission set aside as it pertains to him personally. 
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Defendant State Insurance Fund, as the workmen's compensation 
insc:: 
for Freeport Transport, Inc., requests that the finding of joint 1 
and several liability of Kinne be affirmed on review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In addition to those facts set forth in the brief of 
plaintiff Charles Kinne, and as a supplement thereto, defendant 
State Insurance Fund would note that it is undisputed that Charles I 
Kinne owned the vehicle in which Max L. Wynn was riding at the 
time of his death, that Kinne was responsible for paying the 
deceased his wages, and that Kinne both agreed by contract to 
retain the right to hire and fire drivers for his trucks and 
exercised that right in fact. 
I 
The State Insurance Fund has paid Susan Wynn the benefit:, 
provided for in the Order of the Industrial Commission and expresse! 
I 
no opinion on plaintiff Kinne's assertion that Mr. Wynn was not 
within the course and scope of his employment at the time of his 
death. However, the Fund believes the finding of joint and 
several liability between Kinne and Freeport Transport, Inc., shoul: 
be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. CHARLES KINNE WAS THE DIRECT EMPLOYER OF MAX L. WYNN Ai~D 
AS SUCH IS LIABLE TO HIS DEPENDENTS FOR THE STATUTORILY PRESCRIBED'. 
I WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS. 
The essential error in Mr. Kinne's assertion that he 
was not the employer of Max L. Wynn at the time of his death stems 
-2-
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from a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of the employer-
i employee relationship as it has been developed under Utah• s Workmen's 
compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. §35-1-1, et seq. (1953). Our 
statute, like most compensation legislation, contains no precise 
or exhaustive definition of employment. The basic definition of 
"employer" is found in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (2) (Supp. 1979), 
which provides in relevant part that the term includes 
Every person, firm and private corporation, 
including every public utility, having in 
service one or more workmen or operatives 
regularly employed in the same business, or 
in or about the same establishment, under 
any contract of hire, express or implied, 
oral or written 
This admittedly vague definition has been interpreted 
by this Court, since the inception of workmen's compensation, to 
include all those employer-employee relationships which were 
included within the traditional common law criteria for defining 
a master and servant relationship. In early cases decided under 
the Act, this Court suggested the following tests for determining 
who was a servant's employer in the absence of an express contract 
of employment: (1) who was responsible for the selection and 
employment of the servant; (2) who paid the servant's wages; (3) 
who had the power to discharge the servant; (4) who had control 
over his actions; and (5) whose work was being done and who was 
receiving the benefit of the servant's labors. See Murray v. 
Wasatch Grading Company, 73 Utah 430, 274 P. 940 (1929); ~ 
£aunty v. Industrial Comm'n, 93 Utah 85, 71 P.2d 177 (1937}. 
-3-
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Experience in other jurisdictions which had adopted 
these same criteria for determining the existence f th 
o e ernp loyrne: 
relationship made it apparent that the beneficial goals of 
workme:. 
compensation legislation were often undermined by a strict 
applicai 
of such master and servant principles. This resulted from the 
unfortunate propensity of some of those engaged in various forms 
of commerce to seek to avoid any responsibility to insure their 
workers by characterizing those performing labor for them as 
independent contractors. Thus, a primary employer would contract 
with another individual to secure the performance of certain tasks 
this latter individual would provide the laborers, pay them from 
his own revenues, direct them in most of the aspects of their 
performance while at work and retain the power to discharge them. 
In return, the secondary employer would receive a.specified sum 
for completing the directed task. All too often this type of 
arrangement ended with the employee who was injured on the job 
discovering both that he had no claim for compensation against 
the primary employer because of the lack of incidents of the 
normal master-servant relationship, and that the secondary employ; 
had not procured insurance and had no assets available to satisfy 
any civil judgment obtained. 
To remedy this situation, almost all legislatures adopt' 
the concept of "statutory" or constructive employer. This desigr. 
of certain primary employers, such as general.contractors, as 
'b' statutory employers dictated that such persons had the responsl· 
-4-
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to ultimately guarantee that all workers over whom they had some 
significant rights of supervision and control, and who were working 
at tasks which were a part of the business of the primary employer, 
were covered by the provisions of workmen's compensation. 
was: 
As this Court noted, the purpose of such legislation 
to protect employees of minor contractors 
against the possible irresponsibility of 
their immediate employer, by making the 
principle employer, who has general control 
of the business in hand, liable as if he 
had directly employed all who worked upon 
any business which he has undertaken. 
Lee v. Chevron Oil Co., 565 P.2d 1128, 1130 (Utah 1977}. 
In Utah, this remedial legislation was enacted by including 
the following language in the section defining employers covered 
by the Act: 
Where any employer procures work 
to be done wholly or in part for him by 
a contractor over whose work he retains 
supervision or control, and such work is 
a part or process in the trade or business 
of the employer, such contractor, and all 
persons employed by him, and all sub-
contractors under him, and all persons 
employed by any such subcontractors, shall 
be deemed, within the meaning of this 
section, employees of such original 
employer. 
Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42 (1953). 
As previously stated, the purpose of this legislation was 
to benefit workmen by exi>anding their protection under the Act and 
providing for compensation in situations where a true employee-
employer relationship did not exist. 
-5-
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In the instant case, there was no express or impl~d 
contract of hire between Max Wynn and Freeport Transport, Inc, 
However, there was a contract between Freeport and Kinne, 
whereby 
Kinne agreed to lease Freeport a tractor and trailer and provide 
a driver for the unit. Max Wynn was the driver. 
There was no question that Freeport Transport exercised 
enough control and supervision over Max Wynn to bring them within 
the definition of employer contained in Utah Code Ann. §35-1-42(2) 
(Supp. 1977), and this finding is not being challenged. Kinne, 
however, is seeking to be relieved of his compensation liability 
because of Freeport Transport' s involvement in the matter. Such 
a ruling would be wholly inconsistent with the established princip:1 
of workmen's compensation law. 
I Prof. Larson, in his treatise on Workman's Compensation 
Law, has noted that a vast majority of states have enacted "contrai 
under" provisions which impose on general employers a compensation 
liability to the employees of contractors with whom they deal. Wr.:I 
the statutory pattern of these provisions vary, the general rule i' 
that "the general contractor who has been required to pay compensa'-
••. can obtain reimbursement from the subcontractor, unless they 
have altered this normal pattern by specific agreement." 
Larson, workmen's Compensation Law §49.11 at 9-2 (1979). 
lB A. 
see also 
Blevins & Montgomery Builders, Inc. v. Gregory, 371 S.W.2d 942 
(Ky. 1963); Jones v. Southern Tupelo Lumber Co., 257 La. 869, 244 
So. 2 d 815 ( 19 71) . 
-6-
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Utah's statute is silent on the subject of whether a 
general contractor is secondarily, jointly or primarily liable 
for payment of compensation, but the State Fund would submit that 
in the absence of any statutory enactment to the contrary, 
employers' liability must be joint and several to insure the 
broadest protection for employees and to encourage subcontractors 
to comply with the mandate of the Compensation Act. 
In this case, Kinne agreed contractually with Freeport 
to provide workmen's compensation insurance for his driver, but 
failed to do so. If he were allowed to escape all financial 
responsibility for this failure, it would be an invitation for 
small contractors to intentionally avoid obtaining insurance for 
their employees, in direct violation of Utah Code Ann. §35-1-46 
(1953) • 
Plaintiff has cited cases which stand collectively for 
the proposition that Freeport Transport exercised sufficient control 
to be deemed an employer of Max Wynn. This contention is not being 
disputed. However, there is nothing in plaintiff's brief or the 
organic law of the State to suggest that Freeport's status as an 
employer eliminates Kinne as an employer and extinguishes his 
legal obligations. 
In Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 
(Utah 1975), this Court indicated that 
The main facts to be considered as bearing 
on the [employment] relationship here a~e: 
(1) whatever covenants or agreements exist 
concerning the right of direction and 
-7- . 
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con~rol.over the employee, whether express 
or implied; (2) the right to hire and fire; 
(3) the method of payment •.. ; and (4) 
the furnishing of equipment. 
538 P.2d at 318. 
In the instant case, Kinne contracted with Freeport to 
retain the exclusive right to control and direct Max Wynn; he had 
the right both to hire and fire Wynn; he was responsible for 
paying Wynn's wages, and he owned the truck and trailer Wynn used 
in performing his duties. Under any imaginable interpretationof 
the facts here presented, Kinne was clearly an employer of Wynn. 
His attempt to have this Court create a judicial exception to 
an employer's compensation liability when there is found to exist 
two parties who qualify as employers should be rejected in favor 
of the more logical and equitable approach adopted by the Industr: 
Commission of imposing joint and several liability. It is not a 
question of either/or; it is both. 
Even if this Court were disposed to attempt to make a 
comparison of the employers' actions to determine which should 
exclusively bear the liability for compensation, application oft 
tests set forth in the Ashton case, supra, would clearly point~ 
Kinne as the party to be considered exclusively liable. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has urged this Court to adopt a rule of law 
providing that only one party can be deemed liable for an employi 
compensation benefits. Such a rule is without foundation in our 
-8-
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statute, would be inconsistent with the practice in other 
jurisdictions, and contrary to the unquestioned objective of 
compensation legislation in providing the broadest coverage 
possible to injured employees. Plaintiff has provided no authority 
for the proposition that there can be only one employer for compen-
sation purposes and such a holding would encourage small contractors 
to try to circumvent the requirements of state law that all 
employers must provide compensation coverage for employees. The 
defendant State Insurance Fund therefore respectfully requests 
that the Order of the Industrial Commission imposing joint and 
several liability be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted this --~- day of September, 1979. 
M. David Eckersley 
Attorney for State Insurance Fund 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two copies of the foregoing were 
sent to the following this 
Brian R. Florence 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
818 - 26th Street 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Frank V. Nelson 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorney for Defendant Commission 
State Capitol Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
day of September, 1979: 
Andrew R. Hurley 
Attorney for Defendant Wynn 
1011 Walker Bank Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
-9-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
